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The Fog of War 
Large-Scale Smoke Screening 
Operations of First Canadian Army in 
Northwest Europe 1944-1945 
James C. Bond 
Smoke screens have been employed in sea and land warfare for many 
centuries for a variety of purposes. They 
have been used to conceal troop 
movements, to deceive the enemy as to 
combat strengths, points of attack, and 
preparations for offensive operations. 
During the Second World War all armies 
made use of smoke screens in their 
operations to a greater or lesser extent. Canada 
was no exception and was considered to be 
extremely innovative in the use of smoke 
equipment in ways for which it was not designed. 
The First Canadian Army first employed large-
scale non-artillery-projected smoke screens 
during the campaign in Northwest Europe. For 
the first time, at least in the history of Canadian 
operations, units of trained specialists worked 
to lay down smoke screens in the field. 
Background 
Military smoke screens are basically clouds of particles which are effective in absorbing, 
reflecting and/ or refracting light rays. In North-
West Europe the Canadians used two different 
materials to produce major smoke screens. 
The first was zinc chloride. Zinc or zinc oxide 
reacts with chlorinated hydrocarbons, such as 
carbon tetrachloride or hexachlorethane, to 
produce a zinc chloride vapour which condenses 
in the air to create an effective white smoke. There 
were, and still are, a number of different 
formulations, all of which were known as "HC" 
smokes (for HydroCarbon). In addition to being 
employed in a variety of artillery shells, mortar 
bombs, and hand grenades, HC was employed 
in smoke generators, commonly known 
as "smoke pots." The best known 
examples of these was the British No.24 
Smoke Generator, weighing about 40 
pounds and burning (emitting smoke) for 
12 to 15 minutes, and the U.S. Army M4 
floating smoke pot, similar to the No.24 
in weight and smoke production 
characteristics, but fitted with a flotation 
chamber. 
The second was oil smoke. Three different 
kinds of oil smoke generators have been used in 
modern warfare. An effective smoke can be 
produced by injecting oil into the hot exhaust of 
a vehicle, the oil condensing in the air to form a 
smoke cloud. Some naval vessels could produce 
this type of screen, which became known as a 
"Destroyer Screen." The British developed an oil 
smoke generator which partially burned and 
partially vapourized oil. This generator, called the 
Haslar after the experimental station where it was 
developed, weighed about one ton and was 
mounted on either a trailer or a truck. Its role 
was to screen ports and factories from Luftwaffe 
observation and attack. It produced a fairly 
effective smoke cloud in the anti-aircraft role for 
which it was designed, although it covered nearby 
buildings and gardens with a sooty layer of oil. It 
was neither soldier-proof nor rugged enough for 
field use. The United States Chemical Corps 
developed and produced by contract to Standard 
Oil a generator which produced superheated oil, 
combined it with steam and sprayed it into the 
air. This generator, known as the "Esso," was 
mounted on a four-wheellow-bed trailer as a self-
contained unit, holding fog oil, fuel oil and water 
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for about two hours' operation. The output was 
variable. The Esso was standard in the U.S. Army 
Chemical Corps Smoke Companies and was 
issued to British Pioneer Corps Smoke 
Companies serving outside the United Kingdom. 
The Esso was supplemented in the last few 
months of the war by the "Beslar," a miniaturized 
version which could be carried by two men. 
The Canadian army's first real experience 
with large-scale tactical smoke screens was the 
assault on Dieppe on 19 August 1942. In this 
operation, known as "Jubilee," the RAF close 
support included "smoke-laying aircraft to 
neutralize enemy defences both as pre-arranged 
and as requested by the Military Force 
Commander." Three squadrons were allocated 
to this task and in the actual operation supplied 
support to the Royal Regiment of Canada landing 
at Puys and the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry 
and Essex Scottish landings on the beach directly 
in front of the town of Dieppe. 1 Although the air 
support was of some value, the inflexibility of 
timing of the support substantially reduced its 
effectiveness. Some aircraft did attempt to screen 
the evacuation of casualties from the beach, but 
with only limited success. The experience 
reduced the confidence of the army in aerial 
smoke support, a feeling which persisted 
throughout the campaign in Northwest Europe. 
To put the large-scale tactical smoke screens 
used within First Canadian Army in Northwest 
Europe into perspective, it is necessary to look 
at the position of the Canadian Army in Britain 
prior to the despatch of 1st Canadian Infantry 
Division to the Mediterranean in 1943. In the 
planning for the invasion of Europe Canada was 
not seen as having any responsibility for the 
provision of "Theatre" troops, or units directly 
under Theatre Headquarters command. Smoke 
troops were included in the order of battle of both 
the British and US Army Groups with the 
assigned task of screening beachheads and the 
build-up of men and stores from German air 
attack. Britain, the United States, and Canada 
all had staff and technical staff officers trained 
in chemical warfare defence at the various 
formation headquarters. The US Army had a 
"Chemical Officer" in the rank of colonel at each 
division and in a correspondingly higher rank at 
the corps and army level. These officers' 
responsibilities included all aspects of chemical 
warfare such as flame, protective measures 
against chemical attack, analysis of captured 
enemy ammunition, as well as planning and 
execution of major smoke screens. The British 
had a "Chemical Warfare Technical Officer" at 
each corps headquarters, usually in the rank of 
captain. If staff trained, he was called a "Technical 
Staff Officer." The British had no such officers at 
the divisional level, and only a small staff at 
Second British Army Headquarters. 
At First Canadian Army Headquarters, 
Lieutenant-Colonel W.R. (Reg) Sawyer was the 
GS01 (CW), ie. the grade one staff officer, 
responsible for chemical warfare and smoke. 
Sawyer had a staff of eleven all ranks, including 
chemists, flame equipment and tactics 
instructors, as well as officers trained in the 
tactics, chemistry and the micro meteorology of 
smoke screening. In addition, there was a mobile 
Chemical Warfare Laboratory based at Army 
Headquarters. With the exception of the 4th 
Canadian Armoured Division, the Canadian and 
British divisions did not have Technical Officers, 
and this exception was as a result of the 
insistence of Major-General G. Kitching, the 
divisional commander. 
I held the position of Technical Staff Officer 
(Chemical Warfare) at Headquarters, II Canadian 
Corps, and, commencing in March 1945 was 
assisted by a Technical Officer. I was fortunate 
in that I had completed the Canadian War Staff 
Captain Jim Bond and Major Stewart Bastow. MC 
during operations in the Rhineland. February 1945. 
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Course in Kingston in 1943 and that, combined 
with a B.A. and an M.A. in Chemistry, apparently 
qualified me for the slightly better paid job of 
"Technical Staff Officer," rather than a straight 
"Technical Officer." I don't think that my duties 
or responsibilities were ever spelled out in black 
and white, but it was generally understood that 
anything within the Corps that had to do with 
chemical defence training and equipment, 
flamethrower training, equipment and tactics, 
and smoke screening, other than that produced 
by the artillery or infantry, was, at least initially, 
to be referred to me. This was pretty heady stuff 
for a captain and it was quite humorous, and a 
bit embarrassing, when the American 82nd and 
101stAirborne Divisions came under command 
of our Corps, and the two Divisional Chemical 
Officers, both colonels. reported to the "Canadian 
Corps Chemical Officer." Several years after the 
war, when I was posted as liaison officer to the 
U.S. Army Chemical Corps, I worked with both 
these officers and we had many laughs about the 
differences in rank. 
Early in 1943 Lieutenant-Colonel Sawyer, 
with the support ofGeneralA.G.L. McNaughton, 
initiated trials to determine the practicality of 
supporting river crossings and other operations 
by producing smoke screens by methods not 
requiring the use of artillery or other projectiles. 
It had been recognized that artillery and mortars 
could accomplish the task, but only at an 
extremely high logistical cost, and the diversion 
of these weapons from their role of firing high 
explosive munitions. The actual "hands-on" 
experience in planning and operating a large and 
prolonged smoke screen was difficult to achieve 
in southern England, and in fact only one full-
scale combined trial and demonstration was 
held. This was a simulated river crossing near 
Edenbridge in Kent. This demonstration was 
little short of a disaster, but the lessons learned 
about smoke and fickle weather directions and 
conditions proved invaluable in our actual 
operations. 
A review of the Canadian army participation 
in the Italian campaign2 shows that tactical 
smoke screening was largely limited to artillery 
support. at times on a massive scale, but no 
record of prolonged screening in the Canadian 
sector has been found. Artillery smoke screens 
were mentioned by Nicholson in the Ortona, Liri 
Valley, the Rimini Line and Romagna areas. Some 
units, including the Royal Canadian Dragoons 
were trained in the use of the No.24 British 
Smoke Generators, but no successful operational 
use was recorded. In fact the only reference to 
generator smoke in the Dragoons' history is to 
their lack of success. 3 In Italy the smoke 
resources were more limited than in Northwest 
Europe and of these some were retained in the 
port areas as protection against enemy air attack. 
The Canadian contribution to the D-Day 
landing in Normandy was 3rd Infantry Division 
supported by 2nd Armoured Brigade. In 
addition, under command of 6th Airborne 
Division, 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion 
landed on D-Day on the extreme left flank of the 
Allied operation. By 11 July II Canadian Corps 
was operational and assumed command of these 
formations, together with a normal complement 
of corps troops. Second Canadian Infantry 
Division and 4th Canadian Armoured Division 
came under corps command as they joined the 
force later in the month. Headquarters First 
Canadian Army became operational on 23 July. 
During this period, and extending until the 
breakout from Normandy, the Canadian Army 
made considerable use of artillery and other 
projected smoke munitions. With the prevailing 
winds being generally southerly and the enemy 
positions close to the forward line of our troops 
(the Allied advance was generally in a southerly 
direction) there was little or no opportunity for 
the tactical employment of non-projected smoke 
stores. 
Smoke screens were employed to conceal 
against aerial attack and artillery shelling in the 
Normandy beachhead, principally on the eastern 
flank. 4 This screening was carried out by British 
Royal Pioneer companies, specifically by 
Numbers 806 and 112 companies. These two 
companies were later involved in almost all the 
tactical screens in the Canadian sector and they 
brought with them many innovative ideas on how 
to produce effective screens in adverse 
conditions. 
Tactics and Techniques 
T he basic tenet to be followed in the employment of smoke screens is to 
remember that smoke is a two-edged sword and 
that in "blinding the enemy" one has to ensure 
that the smoke does not hamper one's own 
43 
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operations. When using projected smoke 
munitions one can actually place the smoke on 
an enemy position or erect a screen between one's 
own position and the enemy's points of 
observation. Using smoke generators complicates 
matters because the location of the smoke source 
is restricted to a location controlled by friendly 
forces, or which is not accessible to the enemy. 
This constraint makes meteorological conditions 
very important, as it is impossible to make a 
smoke screen travel against the wind. Wind speed 
is also a factor, as strong winds not only tear a 
screen apart but also reduce the height of the 
smoke cloud. There are other significant factors 
such as humidity and air turbulence (caused by 
strong sunlight or rough terrain), which have to 
be taken into consideration when planning a 
screen and deploying one's smoke and manpower 
resources. 
It is possible to calculate the size ( the length, 
width and height) of a screen from a single source, 
such as a No.24 generator, under known "met" 
conditions. From that data an ideal source line, 
consisting of smoke points of one generator each 
can be plotted with a calculated distance between 
the points. At this point in the plan the line and 
the point spacing must be adjusted to sites that 
are accessible and, if possible, not in full view of 
the enemy. In some cases it may be necessary to 
double the number of generators at a point and 
increase the spacing between points. If using the 
large Esso generators, it might be necessary to 
establish a small preliminary screen with No.24s 
to cover their move into position. Once a screen 
was established and appeared stable it was 
normal to analyze it in order to ensure that even 
under moderately changed met conditions, or the 
loss of one or more smoke points, the success of 
the operation would not be jeopardized. One also 
tried to be as economical as possible in the 
expenditure of stores. 
In actual practice a fair amount of 
improvisation was required, such as the massing 
of Essos at a single point at Wyler in the Rhine 
operation to screen miles of flooded and semi-
flooded areas. The operations described below 
give other examples of the techniques employed 
to provide smoke support, as well as examples 
of failure to do so. 
44 
Operation "Undergo" 
Cap Gris Nez and Calais 
~e first use of smoke in Northwest Europe 
l. to screen Canadian Army operations for a 
prolonged period of several days, was in support 
of the 3rd Canadian Division assault on Calais 
in September 1944. It had been hoped that the 
German force manning the batteries of large 
calibre artillery located in emplacements in the 
Cap Gris Nez area would have surrendered before 
the assault on Calais was mounted, but an 
unsuccessful night attack on 16 September, and 
pressure from Headquarters 21 Army Group to 
open all the Channel ports. forced a decision to 
contain the Cap Gris Nez position and capture 
Calais. To support the division and to minimize 
casualties, the divisional artillery was augmented 
to 19 regiments of field and medium artillery. 
The optimum battery positions for this massed 
artillery were in the Marquise-Mount Couple area 
and were visible to the German guns at Cap Gris 
Nez, at least one of which was capable of a 360-
degree traverse. 5 
On 19 September, as Technical Staff Officer, 
II Canadian Corps, I was instructed to determine 
if a smoke screen to shield the artillery from the 
German battery was feasible. I made a 
reconnaissance and studied prevailing wind 
patterns. I then reported that there was a very 
high probability that an effective smoke screen 
could be laid and then more or less forgot about 
the idea. At 1800 hours on 22 September I was 
ordered to have a screen operational not later 
than 0715 hours the next day. At this point there 
were comparatively few smoke pots (British 
No.24 generators), and no other smoke 
generators available in the corps forward 
maintenance area. Within two hours a 
detachment of 23 gunners from the divisional 
3rd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment reported for 
duty at Wissant where I had established a 
command post. There were no NCOs, no cooks, 
nor provision for any extended detached duty. 
By 0400 hours smoke pots were arriving from 
beachhead stocks in Normandy, and a smoke 
source line some 3,000 yards long, with 51 
smoke points at 50 yard spacing, was laid out. 
The smoke pots were lit promptly at 0700 hours. 
I then moved as close to the German positions 
as I reasonably could to gauge how effective the 
4




Gap Griz Nez 
ENGLISH CHANNEL 
CALAIS 
0 2 3 4 
kilometres 
5 
This first smoke operation. for which we were 
not prepared, did teach us a number oflessons 
directly related to the use of smoke stores, wind 
variability, and ways of economizing both in 
manpower and materials. It also made us 
realize that there was a real need for a 
meteorological officer in the planning and 
maintenance of this type of smoke screen. 
Probably more important was the recognition 
by divisional and corps commanders (and their 
staffs) of the utility and potential of prolonged 
~ smoke screens. This recognition, in turn. led ~ 
©> to the transfer of some British Royal Pioneer 
'0 
}1 Smoke companies from Theatre to Army ~ control. and the movement forward to corps 
;i dumps of substantial stocks of smoke stores. 
~ In spite of our inexperience the screen was 
~ considered to have been successful, and I was 
a. pleasantly surprised to have been mentioned-L--.~--~----------~~--------------------------~ ~ in-despatches for my part in the operation. 
smoke screen was and whether or not the 
emission line should be moved or modified. 
During the day the number of points was reduced 
by trial and error to 18 without loss of 
effectiveness. The whole "group" was organized, 
shifts detailed. feeding arranged, and technical 
support obtained in the persons of a 
meteorological officer from Army Headquarters, 
and one of the camouflage officers from Corps 
Headquarters. The first day also saw us move 
from our original base in the town of Wissant 
because German sniping by one of the large 
calibre guns had become decidedly 
uncomfortable. 
It had been originally planned to 
maintain the screen for about a day and a 
half, but as the assault on Calais slowed 
down, orders came to maintain the screen 
as long as our artillery was still in location 
and Cap Gris Nez had not fallen. The screen 
was maintained until noon on 28 September, 
or for the daylight hours of over five days. 
During this period the supply of smoke pots 
was a constant worry. At one point some 
German NbKL42 generators, similar to. but 
inferior to, the British No.24s, were used. I 
had identified these in a a German 
ammunition dump at Elbeuf, on the Seine 
River, when doing a routine check of 
captured ammunition. 
Canadians astride one of the captured German 
guns at Cap Griz Nez 
Operation "Switchback" 
Part I - The Leopold Canal 
l l Tithin days a request from HQ 3rd Canadian 
VV Infantry Division was received at II Corps 
HQ for a smoke screen to support an assault 
crossing of the Leopold Canal by 7th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade. 6 This assault, made on 6 
October, was the first major offensive action to 
clear the land south of the Scheidt Estuary. which 
became known as the "Breskens Pocket." The 
initial assault consisted of two battalion 
crossings, some two thousand yards apart. 
Brigadier J. G. Spragg e. commanding the brigade. 
5
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wanted a smoke screen extending some four 
miles to both the east and west of the planned 
crossing points. He also wanted a screen in the 
immediate area of the crossings to be available 
and under his direct command. A reconnaissance 
of the area indicated that, barring unfavourable 
winds, the brigadiers's needs could be met by 
the use of a pioneer smoke company, equipped 
with 48 Esso oil smoke generators, and a platoon 
with smoke pots and smoke floats. The Canadian 
Army Meteorological Group forecast southerly 
winds for the period of the assault and for two 
or more days later. Brigadier Spragge agreed that 
there should be no smoke if the winds were 
northerly. No.806 Royal Pioneer Smoke Company 
was put under command of First Canadian Army 
in support of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, and 
placed under my operational control (not 
command). It arrived late in the afternoon of 5 
October. The smoke company commander and I 
planned the company's deployment after making 
a detailed reconnaissance. The deployment and 
forward movement of fog oil reserve stocks was 
completed by midnight 5/6 October. A weather 
forecast obtained about 0300 hours called for a 
change in wind direction to northerly, a shift 
which was almost immediately noticeable locally 
and which made the effective use of smoke 
impossible. The assault was mounted and after 
much bitter fighting the two battalion 
bridgeheads were linked early on 9 October. The 
smoke company remained at the alert, but as 
the wind continued to be from the north no 
smoke was made. 
NORTH 
S E A 
Leopold Canal 
Part II- The Scheidt Estuary 
A second element of 3rd Division's operation to clear the Breskens Pocket was 
an amphibious assault by 9th Infantry Brigade 
from the area ofTerneuzen, westward along the 
south shore of the Scheidt, west across the 
Braakman Inlet, and landing in the rear of the 
main German defences. 7 Brigadier J.M. 
Rockingham, commanding the brigade. wanted 
smoke to screen the assault from observed fire 
coming from enemy positions south of the 
Scheidt, and from the coastal defence guns in 
the area of Flushing. It was recognized that the 
screen would have to be continued to conceal the 
movement of reinforcements and supplies from 
the same enemy fire. Brigadier Rockingham 
stipulated that the smoke must not interfere with 
the tracked landing vehicles (LVTs) known as 
Buffalos, crossing from Terneuzen to the landing 
beaches. The brigade staff confidently stated that 
it was unlikely that the screen would be required 
for more than 12 hours. 
I was not involved in the initial planning of 
the smoke support for the operation, because I 
was occupied with the 7th Brigade operation at 
the Leopold canal. Consequently, Major Temp 
Hugill of the G(CW) staff at Army Headquarters, 
and Captain Maurice Comfort, the Meteorological 
Officer (CW) of the Army Meteorological Group, 
planned and managed the screen in its initial 
phases. They quickly realized that, to be effective. 
the screen would have to be located on the 
Scheidt Estuary itself. Planning proceeded on this 
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With a smoke screen shielding their progress, soliders jrom the North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment 
areferriedfrom Terneuzen to Hoojdplaat aboard Buffalo amphibious vehicles, 11 October 1944. 
basis, employing storm boats and DUKWs 
(amphibious trucks) to drop off a smoke float 
every 400 yards along a dog-leg line running 
northwest from Terneuzen for some 8,000 yards. 
These had to be renewed every 15 minutes, this 
being the average smoke emission life of the 
floats. An ad hoc smoke organization was formed 
and equipped, consisting of three DUKWs with 
drivers, four storm boats with crews, one NCO 
and nine men as a working party, three wireless 
operators with a wireless truck, and 800 smoke 
floats. The brigade assault, which had been 
planned for midnight 7 I 8 October, was postponed 
24 hours. Due to the unfavourable northeast 
wind, smoke was not made, although the group 
stood to until 0200 hours. At 0400 hours the 
plan for screening against fire from the south 
shore of the Scheidt was modified to use three 
Esso oil smoke generators, which had been 
released from the Leopold Canal operation, sited 
on the east shore of the mouth of the Braakman 
Inlet. 
At 0700 hours a call for smoke on both flanks 
of the LVf route was received from brigade H Q 
and was immediately acted on. As the screen 
became effective the shelling of the beaches, the 
LVT exits and the Braakman stopped. The enemy 
on South Beveland (north of the the Scheidt) then 
turned his attention to the smoke-laying craft, 
and to the harbour at Terneuzen where our 
smoke craft were based. A small secondary 
screen in front of the harbour corrected the 
problem, but only after casualties had occurred. 
That evening (9 October) Brigadier 
Rockingham requested that the screen be 
continued during daylight hours for as long as 
his brigade had to be supplied by amphibians. It 
was also learned that the 8th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade was starting to phase its battalions in, 
using the same route. Thus two brigades would 
have to be maintained until a land route was 
opened around the south end of the Braakman. 
It was estimated that the screen would be 
required for at least three more days. 
The extension of the duration of the screening 
meant that manpower and material resources 
had to be substantially increased. Captain Norm 
Mould, the 4th Canadian Armoured Division CW 
Technical Officer was "requisitioned," and I was 
able to leave the Leopold Canal operation. He 
and I assumed responsibility for the details of 
screening operations, while Major Hugill 
remained in overall command of the group. Major 
Stew Bastow, DSO, a free-thinking Australian and 
the officer commanding the 806 Pioneer Smoke 
Company, was an important addition to our 
planning and operations group. 
We requisitioned and received one platoon 
of 806 Smoke Company ( 12 Esso generators), 3 
DUKWs with operators, 4 storm boats with 
crews, fitters, and extra motors, 8,000 smoke 
floats, 4,000 No.24 generators, and 400 barrels 
of fog oil. By this time our original stock of smoke 
stores was very low, good for less than six hours 
of operation. During the next week the wind blew 
from all points of the compass, necessitating 
constant adjustment of the smoke emission lines. 
This entailed constant revision of estimates of 
stores requirements, and of devising innovative 
ways of using combinations of devices to produce 
effective screens consuming a minimum of stores. 
When a shortage of smoke floats developed, our 
47 
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sappers and pioneers built a number of rafts, 
using oil drums, scavenged lumber, and wire 
mesh. These were anchored in the Scheidt, 
loaded with No.24 generators, and a Pioneer to 
light the generators. After an incident in which a 
large calibre near-miss capsized a raft with a 
Pioneer and me on it, a method of chain lighting 
the No.24s and eliminating the man on the raft 
was quickly devised. The Esso generator was 
found to be extremely versatile. It fitted nicely in 
the back of a Mark IV LVT Buffalo, which could 
carry additional fog oil injerricans. Also it was 
found only a few days later, that the Esso could 
be mounted in an Assault Landing Craft (LCA), 
the only modification necessary being the cutting 
out of a part of the LCA deck. The D UKW s were 
very useful for carrying and dropping off smoke 
floats. Also, with No.24s burning on a metal plate 
welded to the stern, they could simulate a naval 
"destroyer smoke screen." In contrast, the storm 
boats were unsatisfactory, the main problem 
being their outboard motors, which proved 
unreliable if run for prolonged periods. 
On 16 October there was a link-up of 7th and 
9th Brigades, thus providing a land route for 
supply, and the smoke screen was no longer 
needed for its original purpose. The II Corps 
Headquarters staff agreed with our 
recommendation that, in view of future 
operations against South Beveland, a screen 
should be kept at Terneuzen. with a more 
westerly screen maintained for deception 
purposes, and to draw fire from the enemy 
coastal guns so that they could be taken out by 
aerial attack. This last objective was not attained, 
although the enemy wasted over 100 medium and 
large calibre shells. 
Operation "Vitality" 
South Beveland 
P'"""f"he participation of the "Smoke Group" in the 
~ taking of South Beveland and Walcheren was 
comparatively minor. It was not involved in the 
advance of 2nd Canadian Infantry Division as 
it fought against a determined enemy. To turn 
the German right or southern flank, an 
amphibious assault across the Scheidt was made 
by the 156th (Lowland) Brigade of the British 
52nd Lowland Division. This division, which was 
under the command of II Canadian Corps, had 
been specially trained in mountain warfare, but 
was fighting for the first time on terrain largely 
below sea level. The assault, supported by DD 
48 
tanks (Duplex Drive amphibious Shermans) of 
the South Staffordshire Regiment, took place 
in the early hours of 26 October. There were 
two separate landings, both to the northeast 
of Terneuzen. Flank screens were provided, 
partly by Essos mounted in LCAs. and partly 
by No.24s on the flank of the landing beach.8 
The screens were modified as progress was 
made by the 156th Brigade, with the gradual 
elimination of the eastern screen. The 
westernmost screen was maintained until 31 
October when the guns of Walcheren were no 
longer considered a threat. Of particular 
interest to me was the sight of an officer of 806 
Pioneer Company with a detachment of his men 
coming ashore on the extreme left flank of the 
assault, casually picking up a couple of No.24 
generators each, trudging up the beach, 
lighting the 24s, and then nonchalantly lighting 
up cigarettes. All this was against a background 
of the infantry doing a classical fire and 
movement advance up the beach. (This incident 
is recorded inA War History ofthe Royal Pioneer 
Corps 1939-1945, which states that the beach 
was under heavy fire). 9 
Operation "Infatuate" 
The Assault on Flushing 
The final chapter of the "Scheidt Smoke Screen Story" was the support given the 
155th (Lowland) Brigade and No.4 Commando 
of the 4th Special Service Brigade assault on 
Flushing from the port of Breskens on l 
November. This was one half of the assault on 
the island of Walcheren. the other being a 
seaborne attack by the 4th British Special Service 
Brigade on the coastal area around Westkapelle. 
Air smoke had been planned for the Westkapelle 
operation, but was aborted on account of bad 
weather. The smoke plan for the Flushing 
operation was quite straightforward, calling for 
screens flanking a corridor from Breskens to 
Flushing, with the stipulation that there should 
be absolutely no smoke in Breskens harbour or 
in the corridor. The brigade commander finally 
accepted the fact that if the wind was westerly. 
some smoke was bound to blow into the corridor, 
but he insisted that he have a direct radio link to 
that screen sector so he could order a shut down 
at short notice. 
The assault on Flushing started on schedule 
on l November at 0530 hours. There was no 
enemy shelling of the Breskens harbour or the 
8
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"Esso ·· smoke generators in operation along a dyke west oj Terneuzen, 13 October 1944. 
corridor until about 1020 hours, whereupon 
the brigade commander together with the 
Naval-Officer-in-Charge asked for smoke even 
if, with the current northerly wind, it blinded 
the Breskens harbour. The hostile fire switched 
targets from the harbour and the corridor, 
concentrating on the smoke-laying LCA. The 
screen was maintained until about 1600 hours 
when enemy action holed the LCA smoke layer. 
The craft made it close to the beach near 
Breskens and the whole crew were able to swim 
ashore. (The water in the Scheidt in November 
is cold!) By this time the batteries that had been 
firing on Breskens had been overrun or silenced 
and the smoke operation was closed. Thus ended 
a month of long, nightly drives to obtain 
meteorological data, of spending most of the 
daylight hours afloat, and of improvising to make 
stores last and inadequate equipment work. On 
the other side of the ledger, we were confident 
that the smoke operation reduced Canadian and 
Allied casualties and substantially assisted the 
Photo by D.I. Granl. NAC PA 136818 
operations. There was also the privilege of 
working with dedicated companions and Pioneer 
troops, who, General Dempsey said, "set a 
splendid example in keeping with the highest 
tradition of their Corps. "10 A further bonus was 
the daily rum issue for being "waterborne." 
In the operations on the Scheidt in October 
1944, over 500 tons of smoke materials were 
consumed, and smoke screens were laid on 29 
days of the month. A point of which I am most 
proud is that we had no fatal casualties in our 
smoke troops over this period. 
Winter Operations 
I\ fter the Battle of the Scheidt the Canadian 
.1""\ctivisions were shifted northeastwards to the 
Nijmegen salient, and offensive operations were 
limited to "active patrolling," which nonetheless 
at times involved very bitter fighting and heavy 
casualties. Second Canadian Corps took over the 
Nijmegen salient from 30 British Corps in early 
49 
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November 1944 and, with some shifting of 
divisions, was responsible for the line of the Maas 
River some ten miles southeastwards from 
Nijmegen and westwards beyond 's-Hertogen-
bosch. To the west of this I British Corps, under 
command of First Canadian Army, had an area 
of responsibility westwards to the coast. The 
winter period of strategic planning for operations 
to clear the area westwards from the Rhine River 
to the Maas River gave the chemical warfare staffs 
an opportunity to analyze past smoke operations, 
and to decide what organization would be 
necessary to implement any large-scale screening 
that might be ordered in the expectation of a 
major Allied offensive. The Ardennes offensive 
launched by Germany on 16 December 1944 
delayed the Allies' offensive. Operation 
"Veritable," designed to clear the west bank of 
the Rhine, was launched 8 February 1945. 
In this winter period there was real concern 
that the enemy might attempt to destroy one of 
the bridges over the Waal River at Nijmegen by 
aerial attack or by observed artillery fire. 11 In 
September the Germans made an attempt, using 
naval mines positioned by divers. This was 
partially successful, but later attempts were less 
so. Similarly. an aerial attack by 73 aircraft was 
a failure. To counter the aerial threat the Allies 
planned to conceal the bridges by smoke. Trial 
runs were made, using different deployments of 
the Essos, while I observed the screens from an 
aircraft. We soon found that, in winter conditions 
in the Netherlands, the smoke hung close to the 
ground. leaving the bridge superstructure highly 
visible as an isolated target. 
On the personal side, I applied for and 
attended a course at the Royal Engineer "Mine 
and Booby-Trap" school at Knocke-sur-Mer in 




rr'fle most disappointing, and tragic smoke 
1. support task with which I was involved took 
place on 26 January in the 30 British Corps area 
to the western or left flank of our corps. A few 
miles northwest of's-Hertogenbosch the Maas 
River divides forming a small island several miles 
long and about a mile wide. The island is very 
flat and typical polder terrain. On the north side 
of the island at about mid-point in its length is a 
50 
small ferry harbour called Kapelsche Veer. The 
enemy had occupied this area since September 
1944 in spite of attempts to dislodge him by the 
1st Polish Armoured Division and Ia ter by 4 7 
Royal Marine Commando. This led I British 
Corps to order the 4th Canadian Armoured 
Division, which was under its command, to carry 
out a full-fledged assault, supported by all the 
corps artillery, and as the weather allowed, daily 
aerial bombing. The Lincoln and Weiland 
Regiment of the 1Oth Canadian Infantry Brigade 
was given the lead role. 12 Coincidentally, I had 
been commissioned in the "Lines" in 1936, and 
in militia days had run a qualification course for 
officers that had included Major Jim Swayze, who 
in January 1945 was the acting commanding 
officer of the Regiment. 
The assault on 26 January was planned as a 
pincer movement from the east and west ends of 
the island, with a third force, in canoes, landing 
behind the enemy position at the harbour. 1:1 The 
smoke support was intended to screen the land 
attacks and the canoe force from observation by 
positions north of the river. It was also meant to 
blind the enemy positions on the island until the 
attacking forces had closed with them. To 
accomplish this, a mixture of smoke sources was 
used, including Essos, Beslars, and U.S. Army 
M4A2 floating smoke pots. In addition British 
smoke pots were loaded in canoes that were then 
pushed out onto the river. The wind was easterly 
as forecast. but very light and variable with the 
result that the screening effect was not 
dependable. It never did screen the canoe force. 
As the Lines war diary stated: ·'the smoke .. .failed 
to give the proper support at the right spot at the 
right time." 14 The elaborate plans for the 
operation changed in the afternoon to a slow, 
methodical digging out of the enemy, slit trench 
by slit trench. In this type of action, no role was 
seen for the smoke unit and it was stood down, 
but remained in position until noon of the 27th. 
From the 27th through the 30th the Lines, with 
the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada, 
supported by the tanks of the South Alberta 
Regiment, fought against a determined enemy, 
finally declaring the island cleared of live enemy 
shortly after midnight 30/31 January. The cost 
in human life was grim, the Lines having 183 
casualties, of which 50 were fatal. including seven 
officers. The losses ofthe Argylls and the South 
Albertas were substantial. The commander of the 
German defending force, the 6th Parachute 
10
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Division, estimated that his casualties were 
between 300 and 400. 
Operation "Veritable" 
The Battle of the Rhineland 
I n a paper describing a particular type of support, such as tactical smoke, supplied to a 
major military operation one must assume that 
the reader has either some knowledge of the 
overall campaign or has access to a good textbook 
describing it. This is particularly true in the case 
of Operation "Veritable," the object of which was 
the clearing of the west side of the Rhine River. It 
is also impractical to describe all the extensions 
and modifications that were made to the 
deployment of smoke lines and resources made 
over the seven-week period during which the 
screen and its contiguous successors were 
maintained. 
In early January 1945, the Army 
Headquarters CW staff was tasked to determine 
how tactical smoke could best be employed in 
Operation "Veritable." A study clearly showed that 
screening the activities of the division on the left 
flank of the operation from observation from the 
north bank of the Rhine, and in particular from 
high ground known as Hoch Elten, would 
contribute substantially to the success of the 
operation. 15 The discovery some time later of a 
German panoramic sketch made from an 
artillery observation post on Hoch Elten 
confirmed our thinking. A Smoke Group, 
consisting of Headquarters, Smoke Control, 803 
and 810 Smoke Companies of the Royal Pioneer 
Corps, and 112 Pioneer Company (Smoke), also 
of the Royal Pioneer Corps, was assembled. The 
headquarters was under command of Major J.T. 
(Temp) Hugill, RCA, with Major Stewart Bastow 
of the Pioneer Corps coordinating the smoke 
companies' activities. Captain Peter Claridge, the 
Technical Officer from 30 Corps, and I were 
responsible for ensuring that the smoke units' 
actions produced the desired results, and if not, 
for altering the plan. The headquarters had its 
own meteorological officer, Captain Comfort, and 
a staff captain, Captain Birks, responsible for 
logistics. When it had been established that our 
old friends, the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, 
was to be on the left flank, we arranged to have a 
platoon of their Engineers attached, as well as 
ten Universal Carriers and drivers from 7th 
Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment (17th Duke 
of York Royal Canadian Hussars) to move smoke 
stores in the forward polder country. A radio link 
on the 3rd Division command net, manned by 
divisional signalers, was provided. Also four 15 
cwt armoured trucks were obtained for smoke 
line reconnaissance and transport of smoke pots. 
The orders from Major-General Dan Spry, the 
GOC of 3rd Division, were short and to the point: 
"The Smoke Group will support 3 Canadian 
Infantry Division by providing a smoke haze over 
the divisional area." 'The best laid plans o' mice 
an' men gae aft agley" is the best way of describing 
the start of the operation on 8 February. The 
flooding of the area from the Rhine to the 
Nijmegen-Cleve road, and the softening of ground 
due to a thaw and some rain, made many of the 
routes planned in January useless. On 3 
February alternate plans, based on the land being 
Waimvrigl1t Park on the Rhine, February 1945 where the LVT4 Bulfioes came to pick up 
smoke stores. The vehicle on the right is a Buffalo, and to the left is a pile of No.24 pots. 
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An aerial view of a smoke screen laid down along the Rhine River near Cleve to hide Canadian troops 
advancing up io the southern side of the river, 14 February 1945. The extensive flooding of the area is 
evident in this photo. 
"soft-going," had been developed, and all 
amphibious vehicles available within 21 Army 
Group (79th Armoured Division LVTs and Royal 
Army Service Corps DUKWs) had been 
earmarked and moved into the Nijmegen area. 
At this point I must mention the massive smoke 
screen produced by the massed artillery of about 
one thousand guns of many calibres. Very early 
in the morning of 8 February these guns had been 
employed in harassing enemy headquarters and 
communications, silencing his artillery and 
smashing his defences. At 07 40 hours, a massive 
smoke screen was laid down, using all weapons 
that could fire this ammunition and covering the 
entire front. Then there was a lull in the firing, 
during which the sound-ranging units located 
many enemy artillery locations, because the 
Germans, expecting an immediate attack, had 
brought down defensive fire. Following this lull, 
our artillery resumed fire, concentrating on the 
identified enemy artillery locations. The time of 
the actual assault was 1030 hours, but the 
supporting fire started an hour earlier, with 
smoke mixed in with the high explosive to conceal 
the assault battalions of the four divisions as they 
moved to their start lines. 
For the smoke troops, the flooding confined 
the smoke lines to dikes and the areas to the 
south ofthe flooding, such as the towns of Wyler 
and Donsbruggen. Gaps in the dikes made some 
sectors inaccessible to the smoke companies, but 
division headquarters considered the smoke 
screen to be sufficiently important to allocate 12 
52 
LVT4s (Buffalos) to Headquarters Smoke 
Control on a full time basis. The Buffalos were 
used to transport smoke stores and also 
Universal Carriers to the dikes, and then the 
carriers were used to distribute the smoke pots 
along the dikes, often under small arms fire 
from the north of the river. 
Driving an LVT along roads covered with 
water, but not deep enough to float the LVT, 
proved to be exciting, as many of the roads were 
mined. On one occasion I thanked "Someone on 
High" that I had taken the mines course, because 
I recognized the end of a Regelmine on the road 
ahead, partly buried in straw and weeds. I was 
able to scream at the driver who slewed the 
vehicle. We hit the mine, but only obliquely so 
we had no one killed, although the driver was 
badly hurt. Our smoke lines on the outer or 
winter dikes were attacked by German patrols 
from north of the river, but these were driven off 
by the combined action of the infantry and our 
pioneers. 
As the smoke emission line along the dike 
grew in length it became more and more difficult 
to supply. Recalling the long screens produced 
by massed Essos on the Scheidt, I recommended 
trying the same technique over the flooded land 
and the Rhine River. We established two points, 
one each at the villages of Wyler and 
Donsbruggen, with 12 Essos at each point, and 
determined under what wind conditions the 
points should be operated. We also set up a third 
12




point to cater for wind variations. We were 
blessed with favourable winds almost all the time 
that the screen was required. As long as the 
atmosphere was not turbulent. screens up to 
15.000 yards were attained. This would not have 
been possible in the mountainous terrain of Italy 
or the hot summer conditions of Normandy. 
The screen. which was operated originally to 
defeat enemy observation of our attacking troops. 
assumed a secondary role - that of concealing 
the Corps Forward Maintenance Centre in and 
around Cleve. This required a screen to be 
continuously effective throughout the daylight 
hours, as once located through a gap in a screen, 
supply dumps could be fired on even after the 
screen had been re-established. Camouflage of 
the dumps and the layout of dummy dumps 
helped to reduce this hazard somewhat. 
The combined Anglo-Canadian force, 
according to C.P. Stacey, slowly clawed its way 
upstream on the southeast bank of the Rhine, 







"E" added 20 Feb 
emission llnes on 
No.24 Generators 
15 and 20 miles from the start-line, with the 
enemy still maintaining an unbroken front. Ahead 
of our troops lay the formidable defensive line 
known as the Hochwald Layback. It consisted of 
several lines of entrenchments, about one-half 
mile apart, with anti-tank ditches and wire 
between the trenches. Rather than continuing to 
push forward with the same divisions, 
Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, GOC II 
Canadian Corps, decided to launch a fresh 
offensive called "Blockbuster" using 4th 
Canadian and 11th British Armoured Divisions. 
The first objective of this thrust, made on 26 
February, was to secure the ridge between Udem 
and Calcar with the ultimate objective being the 
capture of the Xanten area. No call for smoke to 
support this action was made until 7 March, 
when the l29th Brigade of the 43rd Division, 
which was on the extreme left flank of the front, 
hard against the Rhine, asked for a screen to 
conceal its attack towards Xanten. The enemy 
fire was coming from the other side of the Rhine, 
and the probable fire control was from one or 
more observation posts located in tall buildings 
1 2 
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Tile effectiveness of smoke screens at masking ground operations is apparent 
from this aerial view of the battlefield near Udem, 15 March 1945. 
in the town of Bislich (on the east bank of the 
river). A Smoke Control was located at the 
brigade headquarters and 803 Smoke Company 
established two smoke points, one with 11 Essos, 
and the other with 24 Beslars (Esso's little 
brother) well behind the start line, and very close 
to the river. On the morning of the 8th, the wind 
was from the northwest as predicted, and the 
screen carried along the river beautifully, 
blanketing Bislich but not obscuring the brigade 
start line or the vision of the direct fire weapons 
supporting the attack. Although much ofXanten 
was cleared on the 8th, the screen was 
maintained through the 9th and 1Oth to conceal 
the main road from Marienbaum to Xanten from 
observed fire. 
una personal note, 1 must add that I did not 
plan this screen because I had been in England 
testing and approving some modifications to the 
smoke dischargers fitted to the Wasp IIC 
flamethrowers. I arrived back at Smoke Control 
to find that 129 Brigade had requested that I run 
the screen. This was about eight hours before 
the screen was to be operational. I had not 
realized until then what a strain it was to be 
suddenly rushed into action after being out of it 
for two or three days. In spite of the strange 
feeling in my stomach, and thanks to a Captain 
Davies of the Pioneer Smoke Company, we 
managed to please our customer, and I believe, 
substantially reduce both observed enemy fire 
and casualties therefrom. 
54 
Screens in Support of 30 Corps 
'l l ]bile the northern or left flank of the Allied 
VV assault was being obscured from enemy 
observation by a comparatively massive screen, 
30 British Corps, and in particular its 51st 
Highland Division, was having water trouble 
several miles to the south. This was due to 
flooded land, a swollen River Niers, and blown 
bridges. Late on 12 February, I was detailed, with 
a detachment of the 112 Pioneer Company 
(Smoke), to try at first light, the next day, to 
"smoke" a damaged bridge and bridging site in 
the town of Gennep. On arrival it was obvious 
that, with the existing wind and rain conditions, 
the smoke points had to be located where the 
land was flooded. We found two engineer assault 
l." . ..J'u.lv, yu_L u.luyv..L vl vvvl vcu.ll.ll.l.l Lln:::: lJvaL;o:, .fVl 
insulation and loaded the boats with smoke pots 
(no floating pots being available). Because I did 
know something about canoes and boats and 
paddles, whereas the Pioneer officer could not 
even swim, I got the boat out to position with the 
help of a couple of Pioneers and lit the pots. The 
plan was to resupply with a second boat but, due 
to an inexperienced crew, the second boat did 
not arrive to take us off our craft until after an 
alert German Forward Observation Officer had 
used us for target practice. The shelling got close 
to us, but fortunately we had no casualties. By 
mid-morning the wind had changed. and a screen 
was maintained all day by more conventional 
means. On request the screen was kept going the 
following day to conceal traffic using the bridges. 
14
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Evidently these troops, or their commanders, 
thought that smoke was useful. because we were 
asked to put up a screen to cover their main 
maintenance route between Gennep and Hekkens, 
both of which are located southwest of the 
Reichswald Forest 
Operation "Plunder" 
The Rhine Crossing 
'l 1 Tith the final clearing of the west bank of the 
VV Rhine, all activity was devoted to the 
preparation of men and material for the actual 
assault across the Rhine. During the conduct of 
Operation "Veritable,·· II Canadian Corps had 
established a Forward Maintenance Centre (FMC) 
in the Cleve area and this had been screened from 
enemy observation from Hoch Elten since the early 
days of that operation. On 10 March Second 
British Army took over the Rhine bank from 
Emmerich south to Buderich. An integral part of 
the build-up was a large-scale deception plan to 
lead the enemy into believing that the assault 
would be in the Emmerich area, whereas the 
actual crossing was planned for an area further 
south near Bislich and Rees. For this plan, gun 
areas and material stocks around Cleve were 
largely dummy, while the real ones to the south 
were very carefully concealed and camouflaged. 
An elaborate smoke screen was operated from 
west of Cleve up the Rhine to near Xanten, where 
it joined aU .S. Army screen covering the American 
sector. This screen made headlines in the British 
Army newspaper "Soldier," and in English 
newspapers generally, as a "man-made sixty six 
mile long fog." Realizing that a cessation of smoke 
might be interpreted by the enemy as meaning 
that an assault was imminent, a plan to keep the 
enemy guessing was devised by instituting a 
schedule of"smoke" and "no-smoke" days. It was 
also hoped that this action might draw enemy fire 
and thus assist in locating enemy artillery 
locations for counter-battery purposes. 
Because II Canadian Corps was not involved 
in the initial amphibious assault on 23 March, 
the Smoke Control Headquarters, and most of the 
smoke companies, were transferred to the 
operational control of Second British Army. This 
was accomplished with no confusion, or loss of 
effectiveness. We did have one problem on 24 
March when the smoke interfered with the 
airborne landing east of the Rhine in the area of 
Hamminkeln. The landing was at 1000 hours, as 
planned, and the orders we had received were 
to have the smoke clear of the landing zones 
by that time. We had anticipated this, when 
the day dawned with practically no wind, by 
cutting off all smoke generation by 0700 
hours; but some smoke was still hanging in 
the drop zone at the time of the landing. In 
1995 I met one of the glider pilots in Ottawa 
at the Canadian War Museum and he 
confirmed that the smoke had been a problem 
in identifying the landing zone. In this 
operation the role of the smoke was more 
deceptive than protective, but it was 
considered by the formation commanders to 
have been a contributing factor to the success 
of the operation. 
The Support of Canal Crossings 
I\ fter the Rhine crossing in late March the 
.r-\operations of II Canadian Corps became 
more fluid as the advance veered northwards. 
The country was interlaced with canals, some 
large and some small. Regardless of the width 
of the canal, unless a bridge could be seized, it 
was necessary for the infantry to establish a 
bridgehead by assault boat or by using the 
remains of a partially demolished bridge. As 
soon as possible a Bailey bridge was 
constructed. Almost all of these crossings were 
opposed, some of them bitterly, as George 
Blackburn describes in his The Guns of Victory 
in writing about the crossing of the Twente canal 
near the village of Almen by the 2nd Division. 16 
On the evening of 3 April I was ordered to screen 
this bridging site, and to establish any dummy 
or decoy screens that I might think would divert 
enemy fire. A detachment of 803 Smoke 
Company, using a combination of smoke pots 
and floating pots to both the east and west of 
the bridging site, was ready to make smoke at 
0700 hours, but we were requested not to start 
smoke at that time. At about 1000 hours, enemy 
shelling began and smoke was called for. The 
screen was lit, as was a dummy some distance 
to the east, where there was another possible 
bridging site. The screens were maintained until 
last light 6 April when the danger of enemy fire 
had abated. I must give due credit to the officers 
and men of the Royal Regiment of Canada who 
made the initial crossing, and to the Forward 
Observation Officer of 4 RCHA who 
accompanied them. This was one of the 
crossings that was very bitterly opposed! 
55 
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Two other bridging operations were 
similarly supported, using the same smoke 
company: one, on 6 April, a second crossing of 
the Twente Canal by 7 Brigade of the 3rd 
Division; and the other, on 8 April, a crossing 
of a nearby canal by 6 Brigade of the 2nd 
Division. In all these cases the troops claimed 
that we reduced casualties substantially. 
Operation "Cannonshot" 
Crossing the Ijssel River 
T he last major smoke screen conducted under the auspices of II Canadian Corps was 
in the liberation of the Netherlands. This was in 
support of the lst Canadian Infantry Division, 
freshly arrived from Italy, which had come under 
command of the corps for the purpose of clearing 
the enemy from an area west of the Ijssel River 
and striking westwards to Apeldoorn. The 
crossing was to be about five miles north of the 
city ofZutphen, on ll April at 1630 hours. The 
crossing was made using L VTs and assault boats. 
The screening requirement was for a smoke 
box around the proposed bridgehead, to be 
56 
Esso generator emitting smoke in the town of Wyler 
on the Dutch-German border, 10-12 February 1945. 
maintained until the assaulting troops were "firm 
on the ground." As the assault was westward and 
the wind was extremely variable, a joint smoke 
plan was worked out with the divisional artillery, 
whereby the guns undertook to produce the far 
side of the box and we, using mainly smoke pots, 
provided its sides. 17 Again, to cater for wind 
changes, both in speed and direction, other plans 
were arranged with the artillery. This too was the 
first opportunity to make use of a new "toy," a 
4-inch naval smoke mortar. which lobbed a ten 
pound smoke pot up to about 2,000 yards. This 
was used to provide temporary smoke cover 
under which a normal smoke point could be 
established and dug in. The mortar was fired 
from the bed of my 15 cwt. armoured truck, and 
worked very well. An interesting point about this 
smoke operation is that it was the first time it 
was possible to make a fair comparison in the 
tonnages of smoke stores and ammunition. The 
artillery fired about 100 tons of smoke 
ammunition and we used between 10 and 11 tons 
of smoke stores. In this operation the artillery 
screen was about half the length of the of the 
generator screen, and was of slightly shorter 
duration. Of course, the artillery was invaluable 
in reaching points that we could not. 
The screen was modified several times as the 
wind veered and backed, and the cooperative 
effort with the gunners, based on the pre-planned 
alternatives, worked well. There was shelling into 
the bridging area, but it was determined that it 
was part of a predicted fire plan and not observed 
fire. The screen was maintained until dark, with 
the exception of part of the artillery screen. The 
next morning all screening on the right flank was 
discontinued, but the southern flank screen was 
maintained because a probable enemy 
observation post in the outskirts ofZutphen was 
still in German hands. 
Operation "Anger" 
The Assault on Arnhem 
While II Canadian Corps was moving northward after crossing the Rhine at 
Emmerich, I Canadian Corps which had just 
arrived from the Italian Campaign was given the 
task of capturing Arnhem. This move had left 
the island between Arnhem and Nijmegen in the 
16
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hands of the British 49th Division and the 12th 
Manitoba Dragoons. The south bank of the 
Neder Rijn was cleared by 2 April by a mix of 
Canadian and British units, but offensive 
action to take Arnhem was delayed some 10 
days in order to coordinate the attack with 
operations north of Emmerich. The original 
plan called for a crossing of the Rhine to the 
west of Arnhem and a smoke screen to conceal 
preparations for the assault was established, 
stretching from Randwijk, about 10 miles west 
of Arnhem, along the south bank of the Neder 
Rijn, to Huissen, south of Arnhem. It was 
envisaged that the screen would be required 
for about 10 days. Because the area to be 
smoked was continuously occupied by our 
troops, smoke pots were not to be used due to 
the irritancy of their smoke. The smoke plan 
adopted was to establish several "beaming 
points," with Essos to cover the western sector 
of the screen, and a line of Essos running 
northwest from Huissen for the eastern sector. 
When the assault plan was changed to an 
attack from Westerwoort (which is southeast of 
and across the Ijssel River from Arnhem). it was 
decided to maintain the screen to deceive the 
Germans as to the point of the attack. This 
deception was improved by having heavy and 
noisy vehicle movement in the Oriel area. This 
screen was operated from 2 April until the 
afternoon of the 14th, and it did divert German 
artillery fire from the real crossing site. The 
operational order called for artillery smoke to 
screen the right flank of the crossing of the Ijssel. 
To reduce the requirement for smoke 
ammunition and to free the artillery for high 
explosive shoots, a smoke source was 
established, but not started on the 13th due to 
unfavourable winds. The artillery expended 
30,000 smoke shells in maintaining this screen 
for the daylight hours of the 13th and early 
morning of the 14th, when the wind allowed the 
generator smoke screen to be effective. Smoke 
was continued until late afternoon on the 14th 
when it was considered that Arnhem and its 
suburbs were completely cleared of German 
troops. 
This smoke operation was conducted by 
Captain G.K. Wright of I Canadian Corps 
Headquarters with a small Headquarters Smoke 
Control complete with a meteorological officer 
and communications personnel. The Royal 
Pioneer Smoke Companies involved were the 810 
and 845 and a detachment of the 803. Total 
casualties in the smoke companies were eight 
wounded, none of which were fatal. In spite of 
the inability to conduct the smoke operation 
completely as planned, due to the wind, it was 
considered a success. 
Operation "Duck" 
The Assault on the Town of Leer 
~e 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, i~ its drive 
J. northwards into the western portiOn of the 
Wilhelmshaven peninsula to capture Emden, had 
first to clear a crossing of the Ems River and 
capture the town of Leer which was located at 
the junction of the Leda and Ems Rivers. Smoke 
support was requested by Brigadier Rockingham, 
commanding 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade. 
H-hour for the assault across the Ems River was 
1500 hours on 28 April. Smoke was planned for 
and started at 1430 hours, but was only 
marginally effective because the wind was 
extremely variable and grew more so, losing 
direction altogether. With the approval of the 
brigade commander, the smoke was cut off in 
the various sectors, as the smoke from each 
sector threatened to interfere with the operation. 
Thus ended, on a somewhat less than perfect 
note, the smoke operations of II Canadian Corps 
and the screens that had grown to be on an army 
scale, or were contagious, being copied by 
flanking formations. In conclusion, besides the 
other smoke staff and our faithful Royal Pioneer 
Corps companies, I must thank Major-General 
Elliot Rodger, C.B.E., Chief of Staff, II Canadian 
Corps, for his support throughout the entire 
campaign. He always asked me for my opinion 
as to whether a request for smoke support could 
be expected to be filled, and at what cost. An 
example of this occurred a few days before 
VE-Day, when the lst Polish Armoured Division, 
on the right flank of the 3rd Canadian Infantry 
Division, asked for smoke support for their 
crossing of the Leda River. As usual, I made a 
reconnaissance of the area and reported that if 
we took on the job we were bound to have heavy 
casualties and had only a very low probability of 
doing any good. General Rodger accepted my 
appreciation and told the Poles that a screen was 
"not on." It is highly probable that his decision 
saved my life! 
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Notes 
This paper is primarily based on a 1945 report on the 
smoke screens which in turn was composed of edited 
reports on the individual operations. several of which I 
was the author. "Report on Smoke Screens carried out by 
First Canadian Army in Northwest Europe 1944-1945" by 
Lieutenant-Colonel W.R. Sawyer and staff, published 15 
July 1945. by Headquarters First Canadian Army in the 
Field. Reference to it is not annotated in the text. Three 
volumes of the Official History of the Canadian Army in 
the Second World War were used to provide background 
to the individual smoke operations. 
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Dedication 
This account of large-scale tactical smoke screens 
carried out by First Canadian Army in Northwest 
Europe in 1944-1945 is dedicated to the following 
officers of the First Canadian Army and to the units 
and detachments of the Royal Navy. the British Army 
(particularly the Royal Pioneer Corps) and to all those 
unnamed individuals whose support was essential to 
the success of the operations. 
Lieutenant-Colonel W.R. Sawyer, OBE. ED. 
RCE. GSO 1 CW First Canadian Army 
Major J.T. Hugill, MBE. RCA. GS02 CW First 
Canadian Army 
Major W.H. Taylor Gen. List. Technical Officer 
CW First Canadian Army 
Capt. H.W. Peck RCA Technical Officer CW 
First Canadian Army 
Capt. G.K. Wright. MC. CICTechnical Officer 
CW I Canadian Corps 
Capt. A.M. Birks Gen. List. Technical Officer 
CW II Canadian Corps 
Capt P.R.P. Claridge RE Technical Officer CW 
XXX British Corps 
Capt. N.L.J. Mould. MC Gen. List Technical 
Officer CW 4th Canadian Armoured 
Division 
Capt. M.E. Comfort. RCA. Meteorological 
Officer (CW). 1 Canadian Army 
Meteorological Group 
Major S.Bastow, DSO. RE, Senior Royal 
Pioneer Corps Officer 
All the officers and men of 803, 805. 806. 810 and 845 
Smoke Companies and 112 Pioneer Company (Smoke). 
Colonel J.C. Bond, MC, CD (ret'd) 
[at left shown standing beside a 
Beslar Smoke Generator in the 
collection of the CWM] served as 
Technical Staff Officer (CW) HQ 
2nd Canadian Corps. Jim Bond 
continued to serve in the Canadian 
army after the war, specializing in 
chemical warfare and smoke 
screens. He retired in 1958 in the 
rank of colonel. He lives in Ottawa 
and is an active member of the 
Friends of the Canadian War 
Museum. 
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